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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Kim Baker appeals from his conviction for felony eluding, challenging the
district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the Information on double jeopardy
grounds. The district court erred in denying Mr. Baker’s motion to dismiss because he
was charged with felony eluding in Ada County after pleading guilty to misdemeanor
eluding in Elmore County, and both eluding charges were based on a single criminal
offense.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 12:03 a.m. on March 31, 2015, Ada County dispatch broadcast
an attempt to locate a vehicle—specifically, a black Buick—regarding a possible
aggravated assault that occurred at a hotel in Boise. (2/25/16 Tr., p.35, Ls.4-8; 3/4/16
Tr., p.2, L.18 – p.3, L.6.) Ada County Sheriff’s Deputy Jason Woodcock observed the
suspect vehicle at Burger King and engaged his overhead lights. (3/4/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.710.) The vehicle fled, and Deputy Woodcock pursued it. (3/4/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-20.)
After traveling through various parking lots, the suspect vehicle proceeded onto I-84,
followed by multiple Ada County and Boise City units with their lights and sirens on.
(3/4/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.11-20; p.5, Ls.2-10.) The pursuit continued, with the suspect vehicle
traveling between 110 and 120 miles per hour eastbound on I-84. (3/4/16 Tr., p.5,
Ls.11-16.) At some point, Ada County requested that the Elmore County Sheriff’s Office
deploy spikes near the boundary of Ada County and Elmore County. (3/4/16 Tr., p.6,
Ls.11-19.)
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At approximately 12:19 a.m., the Ada County Supervisor terminated the Ada
County pursuit after learning the Boise City units had terminated their investigation of
the aggravated assault. (2/25/16 Tr., p.67, Ls.4-17; 2/25/16 Tr., p.73, Ls.4-17; 3/4/16
Tr., p.5, L.17 – p.6, L.6.) The Ada County officers who were involved in the pursuit
exited the interstate at the last exit before the county line, while the suspect vehicle
continued eastward toward Elmore County. (2/25/16 Tr., p.79, Ls.21-23; 3/4/16 Tr., p.6,
Ls.7-10.) The Elmore County Sheriff’s Office did not deploy spikes at this time because
it learned the Ada County pursuit had been terminated. (3/4/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-19.)
However, the Elmore County officers were concerned the suspect vehicle might exit the
interstate and enter Mountain Home. (3/4/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-24.) Three Elmore County
units occupied the two Mountain Home exits, exits 90 and 95, with their rear flashing
emergency lights on. (2/25/16 Tr., p.87, Ls.1-18; 2/25/16 Tr., p.99, L.24 – p.100, L.16;
3/4/16 Tr., p.6, L.22 – p.7, L.3.)
Mr. Baker testified he could see the lights of the police vehicles and “couldn’t get
off the freeway.” (2/25/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-8; p.16, Ls.2-7.) He testified he “knew [the
lights] were for [him]” and so he pulled over to the side of the interstate “and prayed to
God and called . . . my counselor, my father, [and] my mother [to say] I’m sorry.”
(2/25/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-10; p.18, Ls.10-12.) Counsel for Mr. Baker asked him whether he
was trying to avoid the police when he pulled over and he answered, “Absolutely.”
(2/25/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.12-13.)
At approximately 12:56 a.m., the Elmore County officers cleared their posts at
the Mountain Home exits and resumed their normal activities because they observed
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the suspect vehicle cut through the median and head back in the westbound lanes
towards Ada County.1 (2/25/16 Tr., p.101, L.10 – p.102, L.2; PSI, p.55.)
At approximately 2:30 a.m., Elmore County dispatch advised the driver of the
suspect vehicle, now identified as Mr. Baker, was making phone calls from somewhere
between Mountain Home and Boise stating he would provoke officers to shoot him.
(3/4/16 Tr., p.7, L.19 – p.8, L.1.) Sergeant Burnett proceeded westbound on I-84, and
observed the suspect vehicle sitting stationary in the shoulder of the eastbound lanes.
(3/4/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-13.) Sergeant Burnett made a U-turn with his flashing emergency
lights on, and pulled up behind the suspect vehicle. (32/25/16 Tr., p.103; Ls.5-16; /4/16
Tr., p.8, Ls.14-16.) The vehicle fled eastbound on I-84, traveling roughly 35-40 miles
per hour, which is well below the posted speed limit. (3/4/16 Tr., p.8, L.21 – p.9, L.5.)
Another officer deployed spike strips and Mr. Baker drove over those spike strips,
disabling his vehicle. (3/4/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-10.)
Mr. Baker was arrested and charged In Elmore County, Case No. 2015-833, with
misdemeanor eluding in violation of Idaho Code § 49-1401. (PSI, p.382; 3/4/16 Tr., p.9,
Ls.11-13.) He pled guilty and was sentenced to 60 days in jail. (PSI, p.382; 2/25/16
Tr., p.3, L.25 – p.4, L.8; 3/4/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-6.) Over two months later, on June 3,
2015, Mr. Baker was charged in Ada County with felony eluding in violation of Idaho
Code § 49-1404 based on his driving behavior on March 31, 2015. (R., pp.7-9.) The
State subsequently filed an Information charging Mr. Baker with felony eluding.
The district court found none of the Elmore County officers saw the suspect vehicle.
(3/4/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-12.) The police reports and the testimony at the suppression
hearing indicate the officers thought they observed the suspect vehicle cut through the
median and head back in the westbound lanes towards Ada County. (2/25/16
Tr., p.101, L.10 – p.102, L.2; PSI, p.55.)
1
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(R., pp.49-50.) Mr. Baker filed a motion to dismiss the Information on the grounds that it
violated the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy clause because he pled guilty to eluding
in Elmore County for the same conduct.
hearing on Mr. Baker’s motion.

(R., pp.79-86.)

The district court held a

Following the hearing, Mr. Baker and the State

submitted written closing arguments. (R., pp.93-98, 99-103.)
Counsel for Mr. Baker argued Mr. Baker’s actions “were part of one continuing
event” because “[h]is intent and objective was to elude police for the entire three hour
time frame” and “[s]imply because police stopped chasing him for a time does not mean
he is now guilty of two separate and distinct crimes.” (R., p.94.) The State argued
Mr. Baker committed two crimes of eluding, the first ending at 12:19 a.m. when Ada
County units terminated their pursuit, and the second beginning at 2:45 a.m. in Elmore
County.

(R., pp.100-01.)

The district court denied Mr. Baker’s motion to dismiss,

concluding there were two separate and distinct acts of eluding, and the two charges
thus did not violate the double jeopardy clause. (3/4/16 Tr., pp.12-15; R., p.104.)
Mr. Baker then pled guilty to felony eluding and being a persistent violator,
reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss. (R., pp.104, 110.)
The district court accepted Mr. Baker’s guilty plea and sentenced him to a unified term
of ten years, with two years fixed, to be served concurrent with all other sentences.
(3/4/16 Tr., p.40, L.17 – p.42, L.5; 4/27/16 Tr., p.57, Ls.10-14; R., p.116.) The judgment
of conviction and commitment was filed on May 2, 2016, and Mr. Baker filed a timely
notice of appeal on May 9, 2016. (R, pp.116-19, 121-23.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Baker’s motion to dismiss?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Baker’s Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no

person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

This clause affords a

defendant three basic protections—against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229
(1994); State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370 (Ct. App. 2011). The State’s prosecution
of Mr. Baker in this case violated the third of these protections because it subjected
Mr. Baker to two criminal punishments for a single criminal offense. The acts Mr. Baker
committed on March 31, 2015, when he eluded police officers in Ada County and
Elmore County over the course of three hours, were not two separate events, but a
single continuing offense.

The fact that Mr. Baker was twice charged with, twice

prosecuted for, and twice punished for this single offense violates the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional protection

against double jeopardy is a question of law over which we exercise free review.
State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 530 (Ct. App. 2013).
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C.

Mr. Baker Was Subjected To Two Criminal Punishments For The Same Offense,
Violating The Constitutional Protection Against Double Jeopardy
Double jeopardy may be implicated where a defendant is charged under the

same statute for multiple acts arising out of the same criminal episode. See Moffat, 154
Idaho at 531, 533 (rejecting State’s attempt to separate defendant’s single crime into “a
series of temporal or spatial units to avoid double jeopardy limitations”). The United
States Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), that the “[t]he
Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its
limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or
spatial units.” Id. at 169.
Where a defendant is charged with multiple acts under the same statute, “the
court must first make a factual inquiry as to whether the defendant’s acts were part of a
single continuing offense or whether the acts each constitute separate, distinct, and
independent crimes.” State v. Sellers, No. 42716, 2016 WL 4548086, at *7 (Idaho
Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Determining whether
criminal acts are separate or part of a single continuing offense requires consideration
of the circumstances of the conduct as well as the intent and objective of the actor.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410, 414, 725
P.2d 115, 119 (1986) (same).
Mr. Baker was charged with two acts of eluding—one a misdemeanor, and one a
felony. Under Idaho law, a driver of a motor vehicle is guilty of misdemeanor eluding if
he “wilfully flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or
audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.” Idaho Code § 49-1404(1). A driver is
guilty of felony eluding when, among other things, he “[t]ravels in excess of thirty (30)
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miles per above the posted speed limit” or “[d]rives . . . in a manner as to endanger or
likely to endanger the property of another or the person of another.” Idaho Code § 491404(2)(a), (c).
The district court concluded the misdemeanor eluding charged in Elmore County
and the felony eluding charged in Ada County were not part of a single continuing
offense because “[t]here is a significant difference in time; there’s a significant
difference in location; and there’s a significant difference in the nature of the activity.”
(3/4/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-6.) In reaching this decision, the district court considered only the
circumstances of Mr. Baker’s conduct, and did not consider Mr. Baker’s intent and
objective. This was an error. Had the district court properly considered both factors, it
would have concluded the two eluding charges were part of a single, continuing offense,
and that Mr. Baker could not be prosecuted for both without violating the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy.
At the hearing on Mr. Baker’s motion to dismiss, the district court asked
Mr. Baker whether his perception was that it was “all one continuous event” and he
answered, “Absolutely.” (2/25/16 Tr., p.32, Ls.2-8.) Mr. Baker testified he saw the Ada
County officers “turn[ ] off their lights for a little while” and “then [he] [saw] more lights up
there” and “couldn’t get off the freeway.” (2/25/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.1-8.) He testified he
“knew [the lights] were for [him]” and so he pulled over to the side of the interstate “and
prayed to God and called . . . my counselor, my father, [and] my mother [to say] I’m
sorry.” (2/25/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-10; p.18, Ls.10-12.) The following exchange took place
between the prosecutor and Mr. Baker on cross examination:
Q:

Okay. So up ahead of you, you see some lights? You don’t know
that they’re up for you, you just see cop lights?
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A:

I see them, and I knew they were for me. With all due respect, sir, I
knew they were for me because they just got done chasing me from
behind, and then I entered Elmore County or whatever it was, and .
. . the lights stopped off.
And I went forward to try to get off at the exit, and I [saw] more
lights so I couldn’t go any further, and so I pulled over.

(2/25/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.4-14.) The following exchange took place between Mr. Baker and
his counsel on redirect:
Q:

The prosecuting attorney asked you about when you were pulled
over on the side of the road.

A:

Yeah.

Q:

You said you pulled over because you saw lights ahead.

A:

Uh-huh.

Q:

Why didn’t you just go and—

A:

Because I didn’t want to—I was panicked, and I didn’t want to get
arrested right then.

Q:

So you were trying to avoid police by pulling over?

A:

Well, yeah. I knew it was done. I just needed more time.

(2/25/16 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-19.) Mr. Baker’s counsel later asked Mr. Baker whether he was
trying to avoid the police when he pulled over and he answered, “Absolutely.” (2/25/16
Tr., p.25, Ls.12-13.) It is clear from Mr. Baker’s testimony that his intent and objective in
pulling over to the side of the interstate was to elude the police, which is the same
objective he had when failing to stop in Ada County, and later in fleeing from a pursuing
police car in Elmore County.
This conclusion is supported by the circumstances of Mr. Baker’s conduct. The
gist of Mr. Baker’s conduct here was his unlawful attempt to avoid being stopped by the
police. The fundamental act he was charged with having committed in both cases was
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the act of trying to get away from the police.

To be sure, he did so on multiple

occasions—first, by driving faster than the speed limit in Ada County to avoid officers
pursing him; second, by pulling over, at night, on the side of the interstate in Elmore
County, to avoid officers ahead of him; and third, by driving slower than the speed limit
in Elmore County to avoid officers pursing him. While these actions can be separated,
they add up to a single uninterrupted and unbroken offense of eluding. The way in
which Mr. Baker eluded changed over the course of three hours, but the entirety of what
was occurring was a single attempt by Mr. Baker to avoid the police. From Mr. Baker’s
perspective, there was no period of time in which the police were not seeking to
apprehend him and no period of time in which he ceased trying to avoid apprehension.
The fact that Mr. Baker’s entire offense took almost three hours and involved
different types of driving behavior does not compel the conclusion that he committed
multiple offenses. In Brown v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held the Ohio Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that joyriding and auto theft are the same offense for double
jeopardy purposes, but erred in concluding the defendant could be convicted of both
crimes merely because the charges against him “focused on different parts of his 9-day
joyride.” 432 U.S. at 169. If a single crime can continue for nine days, then surely it can
continue for three hours. The critical factor here is that Mr. Baker’s acts were set on
foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force. See United States v.
Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939) (stating a continuing offense is “a
continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated
by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy”).
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The fact that Mr. Baker engaged in different types of driving behavior is also of
little significance. The district court found it mattered a great deal, explaining: “In Ada
County, the defendant was . . . eluding the officers at speeds on the interstate of 110 to
120 miles per hour. And in Elmore County the defendant eluded the officer by failing to
stop while given the requisite signals to stop but only traveling between . . . 30 and 45
miles per hour; completely different sorts of events.” (3/4/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.7-13.) Surely
the fact that Mr. Baker was eluding officers by driving first above the speed limit, and
then below the speed limit, is not a significant factor in determining whether he
committed a single offense or multiple offenses.
Looking at the circumstances of Mr. Baker’s conduct as well as his intent and
objective, the district court should have concluded the criminal acts Mr. Baker
committed in Ada County and Elmore County on March 31, 2015, were part of a single
continuing offense. It was up to Ada County and Elmore County to determine who
should prosecute Mr. Baker, but it violated the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy for Mr. Baker to be subjected to multiple punishments based on his single
offense of eluding.

11

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Baker respectfully requests that the district
court vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying his
motion to dismiss, and remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss
the Information.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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